Computing an equilibrium of a game is of central interest in Algorithmic Game Theory. For (atomic) Congestion Games, computing a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) is PLS-complete for the general case, while for single-commodity Network Congestion Games computing the PNE that minimizes the potential function reduces to a min-cost flow computation [8] . We study the complexity of computing a PNE in Weighted Congestion Games with affine and linear delays, where O(1)-approximate Nash equilibria can be computed in polynomial time [4] and the only known PLS-hardness results follow from those for unweighted Congestion Games.
Introduction
Among the strongest notions in Game Theory is that of a Nash equilibrium. Although its existence is always guaranteed in normal form games if mixed strategies are allowed, its computation is more often inefficient than efficient. This is true even if the game admits a potential function and any improving step by a player reduces the value of the potential, in which case we additionally know that a Nash equilibrium on pure strategies always exists. In such potential games, a pure Nash equilibrium (or simply equilibrium) can be computed by letting the players one by one play their best response, until they eventually reach an equilibrium, which of course may take exponentially many steps. In a sense, the described best response dynamics is equivalent to searching for an extremum by doing local improving steps.
Polynomial Local Search (PLS) is a complexity class defined by Johnson et al. [16] to capture the difficulty of certain search problems. It consists of problems that admit local search heuristics that are guaranteed to converge to a local optimum, like the problem of finding an equilibrium in potential games described above. There are many natural complete problems for PLS (see, e.g., Michiels et al. [17] for a survey) many of which are or can be regarded as the problem of computing an equilibrium in a potential game. That said, PLS fully captures the difficulty of such problems. Complete problems particularly relevant to this work are LocalMaxCut and CircuitFlip which we will describe later, and the problem of computing an equilibrium in Congestion Games.
Congestion Games (CGs) are one of the most widely studied classes of games in Algorithmic Game Theory. In CGs players compete over resources trying to minimize their costs. More precisely, there exists a set of resources E and the strategy of each selfish agent is a subset of resources s i ∈ 2 E that she selects. The cost of each agent i for a given strategy vector s = (s i , s −i ) is the cumulative congestion on the each resources that she selects to use. More precisely, the cost of agent i is C i (x i , x −i ) = e∈s i e (x e ), where x e is the number of agents participating in resource e and e (x) is latency function of resource e. Usually agents are not allowed to select any subset of resources. The permitted subsets may differ from agent to agent and are denoted by S i ⊆ 2 E . The case where all the S i 's are the same set is referred as Symmetric CGs.
Congestion Games are of interest not only due to their obvious connection to resource sharing in networks and distributed systems with selfish users, but also due to their unique game theoretic properties. Congestion games are potential games, i.e., there exists a potential function mapping each strategy profile to a real number, Φ(s) = e∈E xe x=1 e (x), so that whenever an agent changes her strategy to reduce her cost, the potential function decreases. The latter not only provides a proof of existence of an equilibrium, but also provides a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for computing one (best response dynamics). Unfortunately a polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium is highly unlikely to exist since this problem was proven to be PLS-complete [8] .
Although computing an equilibrium in general CGs is PLS-complete, there are important special cases in which an equilibrium can be computed efficiently. A notable example concerns computing an equilibrium in single-commodity Network CGs. In this type of games, there exists a network with latency functions on its edges together with an origin node o and a target node d. The strategy space of each agent is the set of o − d paths . Fabrikant et al. [8] provide an efficient algorithm for computing an equilibrium, which is based on solving a suitable min-cost flow problem. Another interesting special case where approximate equilibrium can be efficiently computed by approximate best response dynamics concerns a general class of Symmetric CGs [5] .
An important generalization of CGs is that of Weighted CGs where the players are weighted, putting a different load on the resources they choose. Since Weighted CGs are a generalization of CGs computing an equilibrium is a harder task. Many recent works study algorithms for computing an approximate equilibrium in general CGs (see the related work section). The reason for this is twofold: At first, computing an exact equilibrium is for sure PLS-hard and, second, Weighted CGs with general latency functions are not potential games, meaning that exact equilibria may not even exist.
Our work is motivated by the fact that the forementioned results do not provide a vivid picture of the differences between weighted and unweighted CGs, since in the general setting both are hard. In order get a better understanding of these differnces we examine the computational hardness of computing equilibria in Weighted CGs for the cases in which an equilibrium can be computed efficiently for their unweighted counterparts.
This work deals with the problem of computing equilibria in Weighted Network CGs with linear latency functions on the links of the network. The choice of linear functions ensures the existence of a potential function [11] , rendering the problem of computing equilibrium in PLS. We prove PLS-completeness both for the single-commodity, i.e., all agents want to travel from a common origin o to a common destination d, and to the multi-commodity case where each agent i has a different pair (o i , d i ) of origin-destination nodes. Obviously, the second type of games is a generalization of the first. The reason that two different PLS-reductions are provided is that in the single-commodity case we study a more general set of latency functions by allowing them to have exponential coefficients, while in the multi-commodity case all the linear latency functions have coefficient 1. We highlight that in the case of equally weighted players both equilibria can be efficiently computed. In the first case via a min-cost flow computation, while in the second using best response dynamics, which converges in a polynomial number of steps.
Contribution. First we show that computing an equilibrium even in single-commodity Weighted Network CGs with linear latency functions is PLS-complete (Theorem 1). Our result reveals a huge gap between the weighted and the unweighted case for this class of CGs, since Papadimitriou et al. [8] designed a polynomial time algorithm for computing equilibrium in single-commodity (unweighted) Network CGs with general increasing latency functions. For the proof we reduce from LocalMaxCut, one of the most significant PLS-complete problems. We highlight that our reduction not only uses simple linear latency functions (i.e., of the form (x) = ax), but also the network topology used for our reduction is that of series-parallel networks.
Trying to further understand the differences between weighted and unweighted CGs, we turn our attention to the case where all resources/links have the identity latency function (i.e., for all e: e (x) = x) and only the players' weights are allowed to be exponential. The reason for this choice is that an equilibrium in general (unweighted) CGs with this type of functions can be efficiently computed using best response dynamics. We manage to show that computing an equilibrium even in multi-commodity Weighted Network CGs where all links have the identity function is PLS-complete (Theorem 2). For the above reduction, none of the already known PLS-complete problems seemed suitable, since their intrinsic difficulty lies in the interactions between players, while the complexity of our problem stems from the weights of the players themselves. This should not be a surprise, since in general CGs with this type of latency functions and equally weighted agents an equilibrium can be efficiently computed. Thus, in order to prove Theorem 2 we introduce as an intermediate problem a simple variant of LocalMaxCut that we call LocalNodeMaxCut.
LocalNodeMaxCut is a natural special case of LocalMaxCut where the weights of the edges are related in a specific way. Namely, each node has a positive weight and the weight of each edge is the product of the weights of its endpoints. As in LocalMaxCut, the goal is to find a maximal cut of the edges, i.e., a partition of the nodes so that the total weight of the edges traversing the cut cannot be increased by moving any single node from one side of the partition to the other. Interestingly enough, LocalNodeMaxCut is suitable for the reduction we want due to the weights on the nodes, while at the same time it is expressive enough to be PLS-complete.
Our major technical contribution is proving that LocalNodeMaxCut is PLS-complete. To establish its PLS-hardness we did not use a problem that lies on any of the "reduction paths" departing from LocalNodeMaxCut, as this seemd unnatural since LocalNodeMaxCut is a very restrictive special case of LocalMaxCut. Instead we turned to the very first problem proved to be PLS-complete, i.e., CircuitFlip. Note that a similar problem to LocalNodeMaxCut, that of computing a local optimum of an unweighted graph, was shown by Schäffer and Yannakakis [18] to be P-complete.
In LocalNodeMaxCut it is very crucial that nodes see other nodes in the same way. More precisely, any two nodes see the same weight on any third node, in contrast to LocalMaxCut where the weights on the edges may be distributed so that nodes see common neighboring nodes differently. This lack of freedom is very restrictive in many places of the PLS-completeness of LocalMaxCut but we manage to overcome it via more sophisticated ideas combined with gadgets already used by Elsässer and Tscheuschner [6] and Gairing and Savani [12] . Our technical work, though, is difficult to be explained at a high level and so, instead of getting into its details here, we highlight it at the end of Section 4. The ideas used there can be adapted to simplify proofs in existing work [6; 12] and we conjecture that they also can be used to prove hardness of approximation results for Weighted Network CGs with "natural" latency functions, thus complementing the existing results for the unweighted case [19] .
Related Work. While Weighted CGs do not always possess exact equilibria, there is a large amount of literature concerning cases of Weighted CGs in which exact or approximate equilibria can be efficiently computed. Fotakis et al. [11] show that in the case of linear latencies the existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed by a potential argument. Even-Dar et al. [7] study different best-response schemes for weighted congestion games in series of parallel links. In case of identity latency functions it was proven that the max-weight priority best response policy reaches equilibrium in linear steps. Goldberg [15] analyzes the convergence time to a Nash equilibrium of a randomized local search distributed protocol in the case of series-parallel links with different capacities. Gairing et al. [13] present a polynomial algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium in the restricted case of parallel links, i.e., each agent can select a subset of the overall links. Caragiannis et al. [3] and Giannakopoulos et al. [14] design efficient algorithms for computing approximate equilibria in Weighted CGs with polynomial latencies. More algorithmic results for approximate equilibria in Weighted CGs are provided by Fanelli and Moscardelli [9] and Feldotto et al. [10] .
To capture the difficulty of local search problems, Johnson et al. [16] define the class PLS that consists of problems admitting a polynomial time algorithm for computing a better neighbor solution. They prove that all such problems can be reduced to a general optimization problem named CircuitFlip. Later, Yannakakis and Schäeffer [18] used CircuitFlip to prove that LocalMaxCut is PLS-complete. LocalMaxCut searches for a cut in an edge-weighted undirected graph such that the cumulative weight of the edges traversing the cut cannot be increased by changing the set of any single node. It was used to establish the PLS-completeness of computing equilibria in general unweighted CGs [8] . In the same paper PLS-completeness of computing an equilibrium for multi-commodity Network CGs was proven through a very involved proof. Ackermann et al. [1] provide a much simpler PLS-completeness proof of the previous result via a reduction from LocalMaxCut.
From a technical point of view, most related to our work are the PLS-completeness results for variants of LocalMaxCut by Elsässer and Tscheuschner [6] and Gairing and Savani [12] who adapted the original construction of Schäffer and Yannakakis [18] . Gairing and Savani [12] establish PLS-completeness of computing a Nash equilibrium in hedonic games, while Elsässer and Tscheuschner [6] show that LocalMaxCut remains PLS-complete even if the underlying graph has nodes of degree at most five. Skopalik and Vöcking [19] proved that it PLS-complete to compute an α-approximate Nash equilibrium in general unweighted congestion games.
Organization. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we present proof sketches for the hardness results regarding computing equilibria in single-commodity Weighted CGs and multi-commodity Weighted CGs. In Section 4, we give an overall presentation of the way our LocalNodeMaxCut PLS-reduction works, while omitting certain details. The fully detailed proofs are deferred to the appendix, in sections A and B, respectively.
Preliminaries
We first define three local search problems, i.e., problems where the goal is to find a solution which is locally optimal with respect to the values of all other solutions in its neighborhood. Local-Max-Cut. An instance of MaxCut consists of an edge-weighted graph H(N, A), where N is the set of nodes and A is the set of edges. The weight of edge a ∈ A is denoted by w a . A cut of H is a subset S ⊆ N . The weight of a cut S is the sum of the weights of the edges crossing it, i.e., W (S) = a∈C(S) w a , where C(S) = {u, v} ∈ A : u ∈ S and v ∈ N \ S . The neighborhood of a cut S is the set N D(S) that contains exactly all the cuts that can be obtained by moving one node from S to N \ S or one node from N \ S to S. A maximal cut is a cut S such that W (S) ≥ W (S ), for all S ∈ N D(S). Given an edge-weighted graph H, LocalMaxCut is the problem of finding a maximal cut of H.
Local-Node-Max-Cut.
A special case of MaxCut is that of NodeMaxCut where each node i ∈ N has some weight w i and the weight of edge a = {i, j} is then w a = w i w j . In such a case we denote LocalMaxCut by LocalNodeMaxCut. We work with this definition in Section 3.
Alternatively, LocalNodeMaxCut consists of an (unweighted) undirected graph H(N, A), where N is the set of nodes and A is the set of edges. Each node i ∈ N is a selfish agent and has a non-negative weight w i ≥ 0. Each node selects as value either 0 or 1 so as to minimize her cost, which is defined to be the total weight of her neighbors that play the same value. A 0-1 vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v |N | ) is a Nash Equilibrium if and only if for all nodes i ∈ N ,
where N i denotes the set of nodes that share an edge with node i. In LocalNodeMaxCut the goal is to compute a 0-1 vector that is a Nash Equilibrium. We work with this definition in Section 4.
To see the equivalency of the two definitions observe that
i.e., i is at her best response iff the weight of the cut only decreases if i switches sides. Next, we move on to give some Complexity Theory related preliminaries. Local Search Problems. An instance of a local search problem is a triple (S, f, N ), where S is the set of feasible solutions (or simply solutions) of a combinatorial optimization problem, f : S → R is a cost function for the solutions in S and N : S → 2 S is a neighborhood function on S returning for each s ∈ S the set of its neighboring feasible solutions.
Circuit-Value with
A local search problem Π LS is specified by a set of local search problem instances and it is either a minimization or a maximization problem. The problem is to find for any given instance (S, f, N ) a locally optimal solution s * ∈ S, i.e., an s * ∈ S so that f (s * ) ≤ f (s) for a minimization problem or f (s * ) ≥ f (s) for a maximization problem. Examples of local search problems are LocalMaxCut and LocalNodeMaxCut defined below.
Polynomial-time Local Search (PLS).
The class NPO consists of combinatorial optimization problems for which we can decide in polynomial time whether an input x defines a correct problem instance, for which the cost function is computable in polynomial time, and for which it is decidable in polynomial time whether a string s defines a feasible solution, where the size of each feasible solution is polynomially bounded in the input size.
Let Π LS be a local search problem and let Π be the underlying combinatorial optimization problem. Local search problem Π LS is in the class PLS (Polynomial-time Local Search) if Π ∈ N P O and if two polynomial-time algorithms A and B exist that satisfy the following properties:
• For a problem instance (S, f, N ) of Π LS , algorithm A returns a solution s ∈ S.
• For a problem instance (S, f, N ) of Π LS and a solution s ∈ S, algorithm B decides whether s is a local optimum and if this is not the case, it returns a neighboring solution with better cost.
PLS Reductions and Completeness.
Local search problem Π LS is PLS-reducible to local search problem Π LS , if two polynomial-time algorithms φ 1 and φ 2 exist that satisfy the following properties:
• Algorithm φ 1 transforms a problem instance I of Π LS into a problem instance φ 1 (I) of Π LS .
• Algorithm φ 2 maps a problem instance I = (S, f, N ) of Π LS and a solution s ∈ S with φ 1 (I) = (S , f , N ) to a solution s ∈ S.
• For a problem instance I of Π LS , we have that if s ∈ S is a local optimum for φ 1 (I) = (S , f , N ), then φ 2 (I, s ) is a local optimum for I.
Note that if local search problem Π LS is PLS-reducible to local search problem Π LS , then the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm for Π LS implies the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm for Π LS . In other words, Π LS is at least as hard as Π LS . Additionally, PLS-reductions are transitive, which means that if Π LS is PLS-reducible to Π LS and Π LS is PLS-reducible to Π LS , then Π LS is also PLS-reducible to Π LS .
To capture the hardest problems of the class we define PLS-completeness. A local search problem is PLS-hard if each problem Π LS ∈ P LS is PLS-reducible to it. By the above discussion, to prove that a local search problem Π LS is PLS-hard it suffices to reduce a PLS-hard problem to it. A local search problem is PLS-complete if it is in PLS and is PLS-hard. Schäffer and Yannakakis [18] have proved that LocalMaxCut is PLS-complete (see Michiels et al. [17] for a survey), which directly implies that LocalNodeMaxCut is in PLS.
Next, we move on to give some Game Theory related preliminaries. Weighted Congestion Games. A Weighted Congestion Game consists of n weighted players each having a positive weight w i , a set of resources E together with a non-decreasing latency function e : R ≥0 → R ≥0 for each resource e ∈ E, and a non-empty strategy set S i ⊆ 2 E for every player i ∈ [n], where [n] = {1, . . . , n}. A subclass of Weighted Congestion Games is that of Weighted Network Congestion Games where there is an underlying (undirected) network with some of the vertices forming origin-destination pairs. The resources of the game are the links of the network. Each player i is assigned to some origin-destination pair o i -d i and her strategy set consists of all the o i -d i paths. Formally, a Weighted Network Congestion Game is a tuple [n] . In the special case where all players share a common origin-destination pair we have a single-commodity game, else we have a multi-commodity game.
Configurations, Costs and Equilibria. Player i chooses a strategy s i in her strategy set S i (an o i -d i path for network games). All these choices combined form a configuration. Formally, a configuration is a vector (s 1 , . . . , s n ), with s i ∈ S i . In order to capture single player deviations, given an initial configuration s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) we denote by (s i , s −i ) the configuration where player i has changed her strategy from s i to s i while all other players play according to s, i.e., player j = i chooses s i . Under a configuration s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) each resource gets some congestion x e equal to the sum of the weights of the players choosing it, i.e., x e = i:e∈s i w i , and has cost e (x e ). Player i's cost under configuration s is c i (s) = e∈s i e (x e ). A configuration s is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to deviate. Formally, s is a Nash equilibrium if ∀i ∈ [n],
Instead of Nash equilibrium we may simply say equilibrium.
Computing Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games
In this section we state and provide proof sketches for our PLS-completeness theorems. In the first part we do so for single-commodity Weighted Network Congestion Games on series parallel networks with linear latencies (Theorem 1) and in the second part we do so for multi-commodity Weighted Network Congestion Games with the identity function on all links (Theorem 2). For the complete proofs see sections A.1 and A.2 respectively.
Single-Commodity Weighted Network Congestion Games.
We prove that it is PLS-hard to compute an equilibrium of a Weighted Congestion Game, even if it is a Weighted Network Congestion Game on a series-parallel single-commodity network with linear latencies, i.e., with latency functions of the form k (x) = a k x. We do so by reducing from LocalMaxCut.
Theorem 1. Computing a Nash equilibrium in single-commodity Weighted Network Congestion Games with linear latency functions is PLS-complete.
Proof sketch. We will reduce from the PLS-complete problem LocalMaxCut. Given an instance of LocalMaxCut we will construct a Weighted Network Congestion Game for which the Nash equilibria will correspond to maximal solutions of LocalMaxCut and vice versa.
To give the construction, let H(N, A) be an edge-weighted graph of a LocalMaxCut instance and let n = |N | and m = |A|. In the constructed Weighted Network Congestion Game instance there will be 3n players which will share n different weights inside the set {16 i : i ∈ [n]} so that for every i ∈ [n] there are exactly 3 players having weight w i = 16 i . All players share a common origin-destination pair o − d and choose o − d paths on a series-parallel graph G. Graph G is a parallel composition of two identical copies of a series-parallel graph.We call these copies G 1 and G 2 . In turn, each of G 1 and G 2 is a series composition of m different series-parallel graphs, each of which corresponds to the m edges of H. For every {i, j} ∈ A let F ij be the series-parallel graph that corresponds to edge {i, j}. F ij is presented in Fig. 1 , where D is assumed to be a (polynomially) big enough constant. An example graph G is given in Fig. 2 .
Observe that in each of G 1 and G 2 there is a unique path that contains all the links with latency functions i (x), for i ∈ [n], and call these paths p u i and p l i for the upper (G 1 ) and lower (G 2 ) copy respectively. Note that each of p u i and p l i in addition to those links, contains some links with latency function of the form w ij x w i w j . These links for path p u i or p l i are in one to one correspondence to the edges of node i in H and this is crucial for the proof.
By the choice of the players' weights and the latency functions' slopes, one can show that at a Nash equilibrium, a player of weight w i chooses either p u i or p l i . The formal proof uses induction starting from larger weights. The heaviest players, i.e., players with weight w n , have a dominant strategy to choose either p u n or p l n since n (x) has a significantly smaller slope than all other i (x)'s, small enough so that even if all other players choose the same paths (reaching a load of at most 3 n l=1 16 l = 16 n+1 −1
16−1
), still players of weight w n prefer p u n or p l n over all other paths. But then, p u n and p l n get a lot of weight load at equilibrium compared to the weight of lighter players. This makes the links on these paths look like they get some big additive constants, which makes them extremely expensive for all lighter players and these players exclude them from their strategy space. That said, by the same reasoning, the players of weight w n−1 have a dominant strategy to choose either p u n−1 or p l n−1 and this inductively proves true for all i ∈ [n]. Additionally, one can prove that p u i and p l i will have at least one player (of weight w i ). The underlying idea is that if wlog p u i has two players (of weight w i ) then the third player of weight w i prefers to go to p l i , since it is going to be empty. This already provides a good structure of a Nash equilibrium and players of different weights, say w i and w j , may go through the same link in G (the edge with latency function w ij x/w i w j ) only if {i, j} ∈ A. The correctness of the reduction lies in the fact that players in G try to minimize their costs incurred by these type of links in the same way one wants to minimize the sum of the weights of the edges in each side of the cut when solving LocalMaxCut.
Given a maximal solution S of LocalMaxCut the proof shows that the configuration Q that for every k ∈ S routes 2 players through p u k and 1 player through p l k and for every k ∈ N \ S routes 1 player through p u k and 2 players through p l k is an equilibrium. Conversely, given an equilibrium Q the cut S = {k ∈ N : 2 players have chosen p u k at Q} is a maximal solution of LocalMaxCut. Assume that we are at equilibrium and consider a player of weight w k that has chosen p u k and wlog p u k is chosen by two players (of weight w k ). By the equilibrium conditions the cost she computes for p u k is at most the cost she computes for p l k , which implies
is either 1 or 2 (resp. 2 or 1) depending whether, for any j : {k, j} ∈ A, one or two players (of weight w j ) respectively have chosen path p u j . By canceling out terms, the above implies
Define S = {i ∈ N : x u i = 2}. By our assumption it is k ∈ S and the left side of (1), i.e., {k,j}∈A w kj (x u j − 1), is the sum of the weights of the edges of H with one of its nodes being k and the other belonging in S. Similarly, the right side of of (1), i.e., {k,j}∈A w kj (x l j − 1) is the sum of the weights of the edges with one of its nodes being k and the other belonging in N \ S. But then (1) directly implies that for the (neighboring) cut S where k goes from S to N \ S it holds W (S) ≥ W (S ). Since k was arbitrary (given the symmetry of the problem), this holds for every k ∈ [n] and thus for every S ∈ N D(S) it is W (S) ≥ W (S ) proving one direction of the claim. Observing that the argument works backwards the proof completes.
Multi-Commodity Weighted Network Congestion Games.
We prove that it is PLS-hard to compute an equilibrium in Weighted Congestion Games, even if it is a Weighted Network Congestion Game with all latency functions equal to the identity function, i.e., for any link e, e (x) = x. This result is stronger in some aspect than that of Section A.1 since we allow only the weights of the players to be exponential. Note that if both the coefficients of the linear latency functions and the weights of the players are polynomial, then best response dynamics converges to an equilibrium in polynomial time. For the proof, we reduce from LocalNodeMaxCut which, as we prove in Theorem 6, is PLS-complete.
Theorem 2. Computing a Nash equilibrium in multi-commodity Weighted Network Congestion Games with all links having the identity function as their latency function is PLS-complete.
Proof sketch. We will reduce from the PLS-complete problem LocalNodeMaxCut. For an instance of LocalNodeMaxCut we will construct a multi-commodity Network Congestion Game where every equilibrium will correspond to a maximal solution of LocalNodeMaxCut and vice versa. Our construction draws ideas from Ackermann et al. [1] .
Skipping many of the details (that can be found in Section A.2), in the constructed instance for every i ∈ [n], Player i will essentially have two path choices at equilibrium, say p u i and p l i , that cost-wise dominate all others. For any i, j ∈ [n], p u i and p u j (resp. p l i and p l j ) may have in common only one link that itself belongs only to them, say link e u ij (resp. e l ij ). These links (e u ij and e l ij ) are present only if {i, j} is an edge of H, i.e., {i, j} ∈ A, and have the identity function as their latency function. What holds is that for every i ∈ [n], p u i 's cost differs from p l i 's cost only because of the e u ij 's and e l ij 's for the j's neighboring i in H. Assume we are at equilibrium. By the above discussion player i ∈ [n] may only have chosen p u i or p l i . Let S = {i ∈ [n] : player i has chosen p u i }. The proof shows that S is a solution to LocalNodeMaxCut. By the equilibrium conditions for every i ∈ S the cost of p u i , say c u i , is less than or equal to the cost of p l i , say c l i . By defining S i to be the neighbors of i in S, i.e.
for some big constant K with the costs in the second and fourth parenthesis coming from the e ij 's for the different j's. This equivalently gives
The right side of the last inequality equals to the weight of the edges with i as an endpoint that cross cut S. The left side equals to the weight of the edges with i as an endpoint that cross the cut S , where S is obtained by moving i from S to N \ S. Thus for S and S it is W (S ) ≤ W (S). A similar argument (or just symmetry) shows that if i ∈ N \ S and we send i from N \ S to S to form a cut S it would again be W (S ) ≤ W (S). Thus, for any S ∈ N D(S) it is W (S) ≥ W (S ) showing that S is a solution to LocalNodeMaxCut. Observing that the argument works backwards we have that from an arbitrary solution of LocalNodeMaxCut we may get an equilibrium for the constructed Weighted Congestion Game instance.
PLS-completeness of LocalNodeMaxCut
In this section we present the proof of Theorem 6 which states that LocalNodeMaxCut is PLS-complete. As discussed in the preliminaries, LocalNodeMaxCut is in PLS and thus it remains to prove its PLS-hardness. To do so, we reduce CircuitFlip to it. We remind that an instance of LocalNodeMaxCut is composed by an undirected graph H(N, A), and the weights of each node i ∈ N , w i ≥ 0. Given a circuit C of the CircuitFlip, we construct an instance of LocalNodeMaxCut such as from any Nash Equilibrium we can compute in polynomial time a locally maximal solution for the CircuitFlip problem.
Given a circuit C of CircuitFlip, the node-weighted graph that we construct is a combination of different gadgets which themselves might be seen as smaller instances of LocalNodeMaxCut. These gadgets have different goals but what each of them intuitively does is receiving some information to some of its nodes, the "input" nodes, and transforming it while carrying it through its internal part towards the "output" nodes. These input and output nodes are the nodes through which the different gadgets are connected. The connections are not always simple and we will later go into more detail on how these connections are done. Figure 3 : The high level construction of the NodeMaxCut instance. Note that rectangles represent gadgets that will be defined below, circles represent nodes that take part in multiple gadgets, and bolded black circles represent a set of (n) such nodes. The computation gadgets are represented by C A and C B .
Our construction follows a flip-flop architecture that has been previously used for reductions from CircuitFlip to LocalMaxCut and some of its variants [18; 12; 6] , but requires more sophisticated implementations in many of its gadgets, since we deal with the special case of LocalNodeMaxCut. The most important differences and our major technical contributions are summarized at the end of the section. The constructed instance is presented at a high level in Figure 3 . Next, we discuss the role of each separate gadget. The exact construction of each separate gadget is presented in the respective section of the appendix.
For a given circuit C of the CircuitFlip with n input gates and m output gates, we first construct the Circuit Computing gadgets C (for = A, B). These gadgets are instances of LocalNodeMaxCut that simulate C in the following sense: I is a set of n nodes whose values correspond to an "input string" of C. Val is a set of m nodes whose values correspond to the output of circuit C with input string I . Next is a set of n nodes that represent a neighbor string of I with greater output value in C. More precisely, if the "input" string defined by the values of I , has a neighbor solution (Hamming distance 1 ) with strictly greater cost then the values of the n nodes in Next correspond to this neighbor string. In case such a neighbor string does not exist (which means that I is an optimal solution to CircuitFlip) the values of the nodes in Next equal I .
These Circuit Computing gadgets have two separate functionalities: the write mode (Control = 0) and the compute mode (Control = 1). When C is in the write mode the values of the input nodes I are changed. When C is in the compute mode the values of the nodes Next ,Val are updated with the correct output values of the circuit C. To formalize the term correct, we introduce the following notation that we use through the section. Before proceeding we present a proof-sketch of our reduction. The mathematically rigorous version of this proof is presented in the proof of Theorem 6 at the end of the section. We will prove that at any equilibrium of the instance of LocalNodeMaxCut of Figure 3 in which Flag = 1 (symmetrically if Flag = 0) three things hold:
Once these claims are established we can be sure that the string defined by the values of nodes in I B defines a locally optimal solution for CircuitFlip. This is because the above 3 claims directly imply that Real-Val(I B ) ≥ Real-Val (Real-Next (I B )) which means that there is no neighboring solution of I B with strictly greater cost. Obviously we establish symmetrically the above claims when Flag = 0. Figure 3 is an instance of LocalNodeMaxCut and the bitwise complement of an equilibrium is also equilibrium the term Flag = 1 seems meaningless. In the construction of the Circuit Computing gadget in Section B.2 (and in the constructions of all the presented gadgets) there also exist two supernodes, a 1-node and a 0-node, with huge weight that share an edge. As a result, at any equilibrium these nodes have opposite values. The term Flag = 1 means that the Flag node has the same value with the 1-node. This notation is also used in subsequent lemmas and always admits the same interpretation. As one can see in the appendix, the construction of the gadgets assume nodes with values always 0 or 1. This can be easily established by connecting one such node with its complementary supernode.
Remark 1. Since our construction in
In the rest of the section we present the necessary lemmas to make the above presented proof sketch rigorous. To do so, we follow a three step approach. We first present the exact behavior of the Circuit Computing gadgets C A , C B . We then reason why I A = NextB, which we refer to as the Feedback problem. Finally we establish the last two claims which we refer to as Correctness of the Outputs.
Circuit-computing gadgets
The Circuit Computing gadgets C A , C B are the basic primitives of our reduction and are based on the gadgets introduced by Schäffer and Yannakakis [18] to establish PLS-completeness of LocalMaxCut. This type of gadgets can be constructed so as to simulate any boolean circuit C. The most important nodes are those corresponding to the input and the output of the simulated circuit C and are denoted as I, O. The other important node is the Control that switches between the write and the compute mode of the gadget. Figure 4 is an abstract depiction of this type of gadgets. The properties of the gadget are described in Theorem 3. Its proof is presented in Section B.2, where the exact construction of the gadget is presented. We first introduce some convenient notation that will help us throughout the proof of completeness. 
Definition 2. Let an instance of LocalNodeMaxCut and a specific equilibrium of this instance.
The bias that node i experiences with respect to the subset N ⊆ N is
where N 0 i is the set of neighbors of node i that choose 0 (respectively for N 1 i ) Bias is a key notion in the subsequent analysis. The gadgets presented in Figure 3 are subset of nodes of the overall instance. Each gadget is composed by the "input nodes", the internal nodes and the "output nodes". Moreover as we have seen each gadget stands for a "circuit" with some specific functionality (computing, comparing, copying e.t.c.). Each gadget is specifically constructed so as at any equilibrium of the overall instance, the output nodes of the gadget experience some bias towards some values that depend on the values of the input nodes of the gadget. Since the output nodes of a gadget may also participate as input nodes at some other gadgets, it is important to quantify the bias of each gadget in order to prove consistency in our instance. Ideally, we would like to prove that at any equilibrium the bias that a node experiences from a gadget in which it is an output node, is greater than the sum of the biases of the gadgets in which it participates as input node.
Theorem 3 describes the equilibrium behavior of the input nodes I and output nodes N ext , V al of the CircuitComputing gadgets C . [18; 12; 6] .
Solving the Feedback problem.
The purpose of this section is to establish the first case of the above presented claims i.e. at any equilibrium of LocalNodeMaxCut instance of Figure 3 in which Flag = 1, NextB is written to I A and vice versa when Flag = 0. This is formally stated in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4.
Let an equilibrium of the instance of LocalNodeMaxCut described in Figure 3 .
We next present the necessary lemmas for proving Theorem 4.
Lemma 1.
Let an equilibrium of the overall LocalNodeMaxCut instance of Figure 3 . Then
In Section B.3 we present the construction of the equality gadget. This gadget is specifically designed so that at any equilibrium, its internal nodes create bias to ControlA towards the value of the predicate (I A = T B ). Notice that if we multiply all the internal nodes of the equality gadget with a positive constant, the bias ControlA experiences towards value (I A = T B ) is multiplied by the same constant (see Definition 2). Lemma 1 is established by multiplying these weights with a sufficiently large constant so as to make this bias larger than w ControlA . We remind that by Theorem 3, the bias that ControlA experiences from C A is w ControlA . As a result, the equilibrium value of ControlA In Section B.4, we present the construction of the Copy gadgets. At an equilibrium where Flag = 1, this gadget creates bias to the nodes in I A , T B nodes towards adopting the values of NextB. Since I A , T B also participate in the Equality gadget in order to establish Lemma 2 we want to make the bias of the CopyB gadget larger than the bias of the Equality gadget. This is done by again by multiplying the weights of the internal nodes of CopyB with a sufficiently large constant. The "indifference" of the nodes in I A , T B with respect to the values of the internal nodes of the Equality gadget is denoted in Figure 3 by the red marks between the nodes in I A , T B and the Equality gadget.
In Case 2 of Lemma 2 the additional condition ControlA = 0 is necessary to ensure that I A = NextB. The reason is that the bias of the Copy gadget to the nodes in I A is sufficiently larger than the bias of the Equality gadget to the nodes in I A , but not necessarily to the bias of the C A gadget. The condition ControlA = 0 ensures 0 bias of the C A gadget to the nodes I A , by Theorem 3. As a result the values of the nodes in I A are determined by the values of their neighbors in the CopyB gadget.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let an equilibrium in which Flag = 1. Let us assume that I A = NextB. By Case 1 of Lemma 2, T B = NextB. As a result, I A = T B , implying that ControlA = 0 (Lemma 1). Now, by Case 2 of Lemma 2 we have that I A = NextB, which is a contradiction. The exact same analysis holds when Flag = 0.
Correctness of the Output Nodes.
In the previous section we discussed how the Feedback problem (I A = NextB when Flag = 1) is solved in our reduction. We now exhibit how the two last cases of our initial claim are established.
Theorem 5. At any equilibrium of the instance of LocalNodeMaxCut of Figure 3 :
At first we briefly explain the difficulties in establishing Theorem 5. In the following discussion we assume that Flag = 1, since everything we mention holds symmetrically for Flag = 0. Observe that if Flag = 1 we know nothing about the value of ControlB and as a result we cannot guarantee that
. But even in the case of C A where ControlA = 1 due to Theorem 4, the correctness of the nodes in NextA or Val A cannot be guaranteed. The reason is that in order to apply Theorem 3, NextA and Val A should experience 0 bias with respect to any other gadget they are connected to. But at an equilibrium, these nodes may select their values according to the values of their heavily weighted neighbors in the CopyA and the Comparator gadget.
The correctness of the values of the output nodes, i.e. NextA = Real-Next(I A ) and Val A = Real-Val(I A ), is ensured by the design of the CopyX" and the Comparator gadgets. Apart from their primary role these gadgets are specifically designed to cause 0 bias to the output nodes of the Circuit Computing gadget to which the better neighbor solution is written. In other words at any equilibrium in which Flag = 1 and any node in C A : the total weight of its neighbors (belonging in the CopyA or the Comparator gadget) with value 1 equals the total weight of its neighbors (belonging in the CopyA or the Comparator gadget) with value 0.
The latter fact is denoted by the green marks in Figure 5 and permits the application of Case 1 of Theorem 3. Lemma 3 and 4 formally state these "green marks". Figure 3 , we connect internal nodes of the C A gadget with internal nodes of the Comparator gadget. This is the only point in our construction where internal nodes of different gadgets share an edge and is denoted in Figure 3 and 5 with the direct edge between the C A gadget and the Comparator gadget. Proof. We assume that Flag = 1 (for Flag = 0 the exact same arguments hold). By Theorem 4 we have I A = NextB and by Lemma 2 we have that T B = NextB. As a result, I A = T B and by Lemma 1 ControlA = 1. Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 guarantee that the nodes in NextA, Val A of C A experience 0 bias towards all the other gadgets of the construction and since ControlA = 1, we can apply Case 1 of Theorem 3 i.e. Val A = Real-Val(I A ) and NextA = Real-Next(I A ).
Up next we deal with the correctness of the values of the output nodes in Val B and NextB when Flag = 1. We remind again that, even if at an equilibrium ControlB = 1, we could not be sure about the correctness of the values of these output nodes due to the bias their neighbors in the CopyB and the Comparator gadget (Theorem 3 does not apply). The Comparator gadget plays a crucial role in solving this last problem. Namely, it also checks whether the output nodes in NextB have correct values with respect to the input I B and if it detects incorrectness it outputs 0. This is done by the connection of some specific internal nodes of the C A , C B gadgets with the internal nodes of the Comparator gadget ( Figure 3 : edges between C A , C B and Comparator). We are now ready to prove Theorem 5. 
Our technical contributions
As already mentioned the construction of Figure 3 follows the flip-flop architectures of previous PLS reductions [18; 12; 6] . In all these reduction the selection of the weights in the connecting edges played a crucial role. We briefly discuss the points of our reduction, which are at the heart of the PLS-completeness proof of LocalNodeMaxCut.
Our Circuit Computing gadgets are based on the Circuit Computing gadgets introduced by Schäffer and Yannakakis [18] (and used by Elsässer et al for similar problems [12; 6] ). There is one major modification of these gadgets, which concerns Case 3 of Theorem 3. Our Circuit Computing gadgets can be constructed with the weight w Control being arbitrarily smaller than the weights of the other nodes of the Circuit Computing gadget. The importance of this property for our reduction is twofold: At first, Case 3 guarantees the Control node will have very small bias with respect to the Circuit Computing gadget. This is very important since we were able to select the weights in the Equality gadget large enough so as to control the write and the compute mode but at the same time small enough so as not to affect the values of "input nodes" I A , I B . The second crucial reason that necessitates w Control being small is that Control should follow the "output" of the Equality gadget and not vice versa. It is here that the main difference between the LocalNodeMaxCut problem and the original LocalMaxCut arises. The major difference between the Circuit Computing gadgets introduced by Schäffer and Yannakakis [18] and ours, is that the Control node has small bias with respect to the Circuit Computing gadget but weight comparable to the weights of the internal nodes of the Circuit Computing gadget. All these reductions ensure that Control does not influence its neighbors (outside the circuit computing gadget) by selecting sufficiently small weights in the edges, something that cannot be done in the LocalNodeMaxCut problem. Our first main technical contribution is establishing Cases 1 and 2 with the Control node having arbitrarily smaller weight than the other nodes in the gadget. To achieve so we design a Leverage gadget that is internally used in the Circuit Computing gadget. This gadget reduces the influence of a node with large weight to a node with small weight and is presented in Section B.1.
The second important difference of our reduction concerns the red marks between the Flag and the Copy gadgets in Figure 3 . These red marks indicate that Flag node takes the output of the Comparator gadget. These marks are more tricky to establish than the other red marks in Figure 3 . The reason is that both the Comparator and the Copy gadgets have input nodes in N extA, N extB, V al A , V al B which have weights of the same order of magnitude as output nodes of the Circuit Computing gadgets. As a result, this time the weights of the internal nodes in the Comparison gadget cannot be selected sufficiently larger than the respective weights of the Copy gadgets. In the work of Schäffer and Yannakakis [18; 12; 6] the bias of the Flag from the Copy gadgets was made negligible to the respective bias from the Comparator by connecting the Flag with the Copy gadgets with edges of sufficiently small weight. This is the second point where the absence of weights on the edges plays a major role. We overcome this difficulty by again using the Leverage gadget internally in the Copy gadget. Now the Leverage gadget decreases the influences of the internal nodes of the Copy gadgets to the Flag making its bias much smaller than the bias of the Comparator. This is formally established in Lemma 7.
Our final major technical contribution concerns the design of the Comparator gadget. As stated in Lemma 7 our Comparator outputs (Real-Val(I A ) ≥ Real-Val(I A )) even if some "input nodes" of the Comparator have incorrect values. In the previous reductions the Comparator guaranteed correctness both on the values of the nodes in NextB, Val B by the use of the suitable weights on the connecting edges. Having the correct "input values", the comparison step is quite straightfoward to implement. This decoupled architecture of the Comparator could not be implemented with a LocalNodeMaxCut instance, due to the absence of edge-weights, and we had to deploy an all at once Comparator that ensures correctness to some of its input nodes so as to perform correctly the comparison step.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we proved that weighted CGs are significantly harder than unweighted ones, even for cases where unweighted CGs are easy. Alongside these results we proved that LocalNodeMaxCut is PLS-complete. We note that the reductions we presented in Section 3 are both tight in the sense defined by Schäffer and Yannakakis [18] , which means they preserve certain characteristics of the transition graph. In particular, for the first reduction we have that there are instances of weighted CGs such that any best response sequence has exponential length, as well as the problem of computing the equilibrium reached from a given initial state being PSPACE-hard.
However, we note that our reduction of CircuitFlip to LocalNodeMaxCut is not tight. To see why this is true, one has to consider that the Copy and Equality gadgets do not guarantee that the Circuit Computing gadget will not enter compute mode before the full input is changed. Hence, we might "jump ahead" and reach an equilibrium faster than CircuitFlip would allow, preventing the reduction from being tight.
Future directions include addressing the case where both constraints we considered coincide, i.e., the case of single-commodity weighted CGs on series-parallel networks with the identity function on all links. Is this setting constrained enough so that a polynomial algorithm for computing equilibria is possible or is it still PLS-hard? Another promising direction is using the ideas and reductions introduced here to obtain hardness of approximating equilibria for weighted CGs, similar to the work of Skopalik and Vöcking [19] . Lastly, it would be interesting to examine whether, in the context of smoothed analysis, perturbing the weights of nodes would lead to smoothed (quasi-)polynomial running time of best response sequences (similar to Angel et al. [2] ).
A The Proofs of the Theorems of Section 3 A.1 The proof of Theorem 1
We will reduce from the PLS-complete problem LocalMaxCut and given an instance of MaxCut we will construct a Weighted Network Congestion Game for which the Nash equilibria will correspond to maximal solutions of LocalMaxCut and vice versa. First we give the construction and then we prove the theorem. For the formal PLS-reduction, which needs functions φ 1 and φ 2 , φ 1 returns the (polynomially) constructed instance described below and φ 2 will be revealed later in the proof.
Let H (N, A) be an edge-weighted graph of a LocalMaxCut instance and let n = |N | and m = |A|. In the constructed Weighted Network Congestion Game instance there will be 3n players which will share n different weights inside the set {16 i : i ∈ [n]} so that for every i ∈ [n] there are exactly 3 players having weight w i = 16 i . All players share a common origin-destination pair o − d and choose o − d paths on a series-parallel graph G. Graph G is a parallel composition of two identical copies of a series-parallel graph. Call these copies G 1 and G 2 . In turn, each of G 1 and G 2 is a series composition of m different series-parallel graphs, each of which corresponds to the m edges of H. For every {i, j} ∈ A let F ij be the series-parallel graph that corresponds to {i, j}. Next we describe the construction of F ij , also shown in Fig. 1 . 
where w ij is the weight of edge {i, j} ∈ A and w i and w j are the weights of players i and j, respectively, as described earlier. Note that in every F ij and for any k ∈ [n] the latency function k (x) = Dx k appears in exactly one link. With F ij defined, an example of the structure of such a network G is given in Fig. 2 .
Observe that in each of G 1 and G 2 there is a unique path that contains all the links with latency functions i (x), for i ∈ [n], and call these paths p u i and p l i for the upper (G 1 ) and lower (G 2 ) copy respectively. Note that each of p u i and p l i in addition to those links, contains some links with latency function of the form w ij x w i w j . These links for path p u i or p l i is in one to one correspondence to the edges of node i in H and this is crucial for the proof.
We go on to prove the correspondence of Nash equilibria in G to maximal cuts in H, i.e., solutions of LocalMaxCut. We will first show that at a Nash equilibrium, a player of weight w i chooses either p u i or p l i . Additionally, we prove that p u i and p l i will have at least one player (of weight w i ). This already provides a good structure of a Nash equilibrium and players of different weights, say w i and w j , may go through the same link in G (the edge with latency function w ij x/w i w j ) only if {i, j} ∈ A. The correctness of the reduction lies in the fact that players in G try to minimize their costs incurred by these type of links in the same way one wants to minimize the sum of the weights of the edges in each side of the cut when solving LocalMaxCut.
To begin with, we will prove that at equilibrium any player of weight w i chooses either p u i or p l i and at least one such player chooses each of p u i and p l i . For that, we will need the following proposition as a building block, which will also reveal a suitable value for D. Proposition 7. For some i, j ∈ [n] consider F ij (Fig. 1) and assume that for all k ∈ [n], there are either one, two or three players of weight w k that have to choose an o ij − d ij path. At equilibrium, all players of weight w k (for any k ∈ [n]) will go through the path that contains a link with latency function k (x).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the different weights starting from bigger weights. For any k ∈ [n] call e k the link of F ij with latency function k (x) and call e ij the link with latency function w ij x w i w j . For some k ∈ [n] assume that for all l > k all players of weight w l have chosen the path containing e l and lets prove that this is the case for players of weight w k as well. Since D is going to be big enough, for the moment ignore link e ij and assume that in F ij there are only n parallel paths each consisting of a single link.
Let the players be at equilibrium and consider any player, say player K, of weight w k . The cost she computes on e k is upper bounded by the cost of e k if all players with weight up to w k are on e k , since by induction players with weight > w k are not on e k at equilibrium. This cost is upper
For any link e l for l < k, the cost that K computes is lower bounded by c < = D16 k 4 k−1 since she must include herself in the load of e l and the link with the smallest slope in its latency function is
Thus, at equilibrium players of weight w k cannot be on any of the e l 's for all l < k. On the other hand, the cost that K computes for e l for l > k is at least c > l = D(16 l +16 k ) 4 l , since by induction e l is already chosen by at least one player of weight w l . But then c k < c > l since
Thus, at equilibrium players of weight w k cannot be on any of the e l 's for all l > k. This completes the induction for the simplified case where we ignored the existence of e ij , but lets go on to include it and define D so that the same analysis goes through. By the above,
> D (this difference is minimized for l = k + 1). On the other hand the maximum cost that link e ij may have is bounded above by c ij = w ij 3 n l=1 16 l w i w j , as e ij can be chosen by at most all of the players and note that c ij ≤ 16 n+1 max q,r∈[n] w qr . Thus, one can choose a big value for D, namely D = 16 n+1 max q,r∈[n] w qr , so that even if a player with weight w k has to add the cost of e ij when computing her path cost, it still is
, implying that at equilibrium all players of weight w k may only choose the path that goes through e k .
Other than revealing a value for D, the proof of Porposition 7 reveals a crucial property: a player of weight w k in F ij strictly prefers the path containing e k to the path containing e l for any l < k, independent to whether players of weight > w k are present in the game or not. With this in mind we go back to prove that at equilibrium any player of weight w i chooses either p u i or p l i and at least one such player chooses each of p u i and p l i . The proof is by induction, starting from bigger weights.
Assume that by the inductive hypothesis for every i > k, players with weights w i have chosen paths p u i or p l i and at least one such player chooses each of p u i and p l i . Consider a player of weight w k , and, wlog, let her have chosen an o − d path through G 1 . Since at least one player for every bigger weight is by induction already in the paths of G 1 (each in her corresponding p u i ), Proposition 7 and the remark after its proof give that in each of the F ij 's the player of weight w k has chosen the subpath of p u k , and this may happen only if her chosen path is p u k . It remains to show that there is another player of weight w k that goes through G 2 , which, with an argument similar to the previous one, is equivalent to this player choosing path p l k . To reach a contradiction, let p u k be chosen by all three players of weight w k , which leaves p l k empty. Since all players of bigger weights are by induction settled in paths completely disjoint to p l k , the load on this path if we include a player of weight w k is upper bounded by the sum of all players of weight < w k plus w k , i.e., 16 k + 3 k−1 t=1 16 t = 16 k + 3 16 k −1 16−1 , which is less than the lower bound on the load of p u k , i.e., 3 · 16 k (since p u k carries 3 players of weight 16 k ). This already is a contradiction to the equilibrium property, since p u k and p l k share the exact same latency functions on their links which, given the above inequality on the loads, makes p u k more costly than p l k for a player of weight w k . To summarize, we have the following. Proposition 8. At equilibrium, for every i ∈ [n] a player of weight w i chooses either p u i or p l i . Additionally, each of p u i and p l i have been chosen by at least one player (of weight w i ). Finally, we prove that every equilibrium of the constructed instance corresponds to a maximal solution of LocalMaxCut and vice versa. Given a maximal solution S of LocalMaxCut we will show that the configuration Q that for every k ∈ S routes 2 players through p u k and 1 player through p l k and for every k ∈ N \ S routes 1 player through p u k and 2 players through p l k is an equilibrium. Conversely, given an equilibrium Q the cut S = {k ∈ N : 2 players have chosen p u k at Q} is a maximal solution of LocalMaxCut.
Assume that we are at equilibrium and consider a player of weight w k that has chosen p u k and wlog p u k is chosen by two players (of weight w k ). By the equilibrium conditions the cost she computes for p u k is at most the cost she computes for p l k , which, given Proposition 8, implies
where x u j (resp. x l j ) is either 1 or 2 (resp. 2 or 1) depending whether, for any j : {k, j} ∈ A, one or two players (of weight w j ) respectively have chosen path p u j . By canceling out terms, the above implies
Define S = {i ∈ N : x u i = 2}. By our assumption it is k ∈ S and the left side of (2), i.e., {k,j}∈A w kj (x u j − 1), is the sum of the weights of the edges of H with one of its nodes being k and the other belonging in S. Similarly, the right side of of (2), i.e., {k,j}∈A w kj (x l j − 1) is the sum of the weights of the edges with one of its nodes being k and the other belonging in N \ S. But then (2) directly implies that for the (neighboring) cut S where k goes from S to N \ S it holds W (S) ≥ W (S ). Since k was arbitrary (given the symmetry of the problem), this holds for every k ∈ [n] and thus for every S ∈ N D(S) it is W (S) ≥ W (S ) proving one direction of the claim. Observing that the argument works backwards we complete the proof. For the formal proo, to define function φ 2 , given the constructed instance and one of its solutions, say s , φ 2 returns solution s = {k ∈ N : 2 players have chosen p u k at s }. 
A.2 The proof of Theorem 2
We will reduce from the PLS-complete problem LocalNodeMaxCut. Our construction draws ideas from Ackermann et al. [1] . For an instance of LocalNodeMaxCut we will construct a multi-commodity Network Congestion Game where every equilibrium will correspond to a maximal solution of LocalNodeMaxCut and vice versa. For the formal PLS-reduction, which needs functions φ 1 and φ 2 , φ 1 returns the (polynomially) constructed instance described below and φ 2 will be revealed later in the proof.
We will use only the identity function as the latency function of every link, but for ease of presentation we will first prove our claim assuming we can use constant latency functions on the links. Then we will describe how we can drop this assumption and use only the identity function on all links, and have the proof still going through. Let H(N, A) be the node-weighted graph of an instance of LocalNodeMaxCut and let n = |N | and m = |A|. The Weighted Network Congestion Game will have n players, with player i having her own origin destination o i − d i pair and weight w i equal to the weight of node i ∈ N . In the constructed network there will be many o i − d i paths for every player i but there will be exactly two paths that cost-wise dominate all others. At equilibrium, every player will choose one of these two paths that correspond to her. This choice for player i will be equivalent to picking the side of the cut that node i should lie in order to get a maximal solution of LocalNodeMaxCut.
The initial network construction is shown in Fig. 6 . It has n origins and n destinations. The rest of the vertices lie either on the lower-left half (including the diagonal) of a n × n grid, which we call the upper part, or the upper-left half of another n × n grid, which we call the lower part. Other than the links of the two half-grids that are all present, there are links connecting the origins and the destinations to the two parts. For i ∈ [n], origin o i in each of the upper and lower parts connects to the first (from left to right) vertex of the row that has i vertices in total. For i ∈ [n], destination d i in each of the upper and lower parts connects to the i-th vertex of the row that has n vertices in total. To define the (constant) latency functions, we will need 2 big constants, say d and D = n 3 d, and note that D d. All links that connect to an origin or a destination and all the vertical links of the half-grids will have constant D as their latency function, and any horizontal link that lies on a row with i vertices will have constant i · d as its latency function. To finalize the construction we will do some small changes but note that, as it is now, player i has two shortest paths that are far less costly (at least by d) than all other paths. These two paths are path p u i that starts at o i , continues horizontally through the upper part for as much as it can and then continues vertically to reach d i , and path p l i which does the exact same thing through the lower part (for an example see Fig. 6a ). Each of p u i and p l i costs equal to c i = 2D + i(i − 1)d + (n − i)D. To verify this claim simply note that (i) if a path tries to go through another origin or moves vertically away from d i in order to reach less costly horizontal links, then it will have to pass through at least (2 + i − 1) + 2 vertical links of cost D and its cost from such edges compared to p u i 's and p l i 's costs increases by at least 2D = 2n 3 d, which is already more than paying all horizontal links; and (ii) if it moves vertically towards d i earlier than p u i or p l i then its cost increases by at least d, since it moves towards more costly horizontal links. To complete the construction if {i, j} ∈ A (with wlog i < j) we replace the (red) vertex at position i, j of the upper and the lower half-grid (1, 1 is top left for the upper half-grid and lower left for the lower half-grid) with two vertices connected with a link, say e u ij and e l ij respectively, with latency function ij (x) = x, where the first vertex connects with the vertices at positions i, j − 1 and i − 1, j of the grid and the second vertex connects to the vertices at positions i + 1, j and i, j + 1 (see also Fig. 6b ). Note that if we take d k∈[n] w k , then, for any i ∈ [n], paths p u i and p l i still have significantly lower costs than all other o i − d i paths. Additionally, if {i, j} ∈ A then p u i and p u j have a single common link and p l i and p l j have a single common link, namely e u ij and e l ij respectively, which add some extra cost to the paths (added to c i defined above).
Assume we are at equilibrium. By the above discussion player i ∈ [n] may only have chosen p u i or p l i . Let S = {i ∈ [n] : player i has chosen p u i }. We will prove that S is a solution to LocalNodeMaxCut. By the equilibrium conditions for every i ∈ S the cost of p u i , say c u i , is less than or equal to the cost of p l i , say c l i . Given the choices of the rest of the players, and by defining S i to be the neighbors of i in S, i.e. S i = {j ∈ S : {i, j} ∈ A}, and N i be the neighbors of i in N , i.e. N i = {j ∈ N : {i, j} ∈ A}, c u i ≤ c l i translates to
with the costs in the second and fourth parenthesis coming from the e ij 's for the different j's. This equivalently gives
The right side of the last inequality equals to the weight of the edges with i as an endpoint that cross cut S. The left side equals to the weight of the edges with i as an endpoint that cross the cut S , where S is obtained by moving i from S to N \ S. Thus for S and S it is W (S ) ≤ W (S). A similar argument (or just symmetry) shows that if i ∈ N \ S and we send i from N \ S to S to form a cut S it would again be W (S ) ≤ W (S). Thus, for any S ∈ N D(S) it is W (S) ≥ W (S ) showing that S is a solution to LocalNodeMaxCut. Observing that the argument works backwards we have that from an arbitrary solution of LocalNodeMaxCut we may get an equilibrium for the constructed Weighted Congestion Game instance. For the formal part, to define function φ 2 , given the constructed instance and one of its solutions, φ 2 returns solution s = {i ∈ [n] : player i has chosen p u i }. What remains to show is how we can almost simulate the constant latency functions so that we use only the identity function on all links and, for every i ∈ [n], player i still may only choose paths p u i or p l i at equilibrium. Observe that, since we have a multi-commodity instance we can simulate (exponentially large) constants by replacing a link {j, k} with a three link path j − o jk − d jk − k, adding a player with origin o jk and destination d jk and weight equal to the desired constant. Depending on the rest of the structure we may additionally have to make sure (by suitably defining latency functions) that this player prefers going through link {o jk , d jk } at equilibrium.
To begin with, consider any horizontal link {j, k} with latency function i · d (for some i ∈ [n]) and replace it with a three link path j − o jk − d jk − k. Add a player with origin o jk and destination d jk with weight equal to in 3 w, where w = i∈[n] w i , and let all links have the identity function. At equilibrium no matter the sum of the weights of the players that choose this three link path, the o jk − d jk player prefers to use the direct o jk − d jk link or else she pays at least double the cost (middle link vs first and third links). Thus the above replacement is (at equilibrium) equivalent to having link {j, k} with latency function 3x + in 3 
Similarly, consider any link {j, k} with latency function D and replace it with a three link path j − o jk − d jk − k. Add a player with origin o jk and destination d jk with weight equal to n 3 d and let all links have the identity function. Similar to above, this replacement is (at equilibrium) equivalent to having link {j, k} with latency function 3x + n 3 d = 3x + D, for D = n 3 d.
With these definitions, at equilibrium, all complementary players will go through the correct links and, due to the complementary players, all links that connect to an origin or a destination will have cost ≈ D, all vertical links of the half-grids will cost ≈ D, and any horizontal link that lies on a row with i vertices will cost ≈ i · d, where "≈" means at most within ±3w = ± 3d n 3 (note that w is the maximum weight that the o i − d i players can add to each of the three link paths). Additionally, for every i ∈ [n], p u i and p l i are structurally identical, i.e., they have the same structure, identical complementary players on their links and share the same latency functions. All the above make the analysis go through in the same way as in the simplified construction.
B Details for the PLS-completeness Proof of LocalNodeMaxCut
In the following sections we fully present all the details of the construction for the proof of Theorem 6. Recall that our NodeMaxCut instance is composed of the following gadgets:
1. Leverage gadgets that are used to transmit nonzero bias to nodes of high weight.
2. Two Circuit Computing gadgets A,B that calculate the values and next neighbors of solutions.
A Comparator gadget
4. Two Copy gadgets that transfer the solution of one circuit to ther other, and vice versa. 5 . Two controller gadgets that decide which circuit should enter write or compute mode.
Note that whenever we wish to have a node of higher weight that dominates all other nodes of lower weight, we multiply its weight with 2 kN for some constantr k. We then choose N sufficiently high so that, for all k, nodes of weight 2 kN dominate all nodes of weight 2 (k−1)N . Henceforth, we will assume N has been chosen sufficiently high for this purpose.
Moreover, when we have constant nodes of a certain value (i.e. pinned to 1) we connect them with one of two supernodes. Supernodes are nodes of huge weight that share an edge and as a result at any equilibrium these nodes have opposite value. In particular, these supernodes have weight 2 1000N which dominates the weight of any other node, given we chose N as described above. The term Control = 1 means that the Control node has the same value with the 1-node.
When we reference the value of a circuit, we will mean the value that the underlying CircuitFlip instance would output given the same input.
When we reference the value of a node we will mean the side of the cut it lies on. There are two values, 0, 1 for each side of the cut.
B.1 Leverage Gadget
The Leverage gadget is a basic construction in the PLS completeness proof. This gadget solves a basic problem in the reduction. Suppose that we have a node with relatively small weight A and we want to bias a node with large weight B. For example, the large node might be indifferent towards its other neighbors, which would allow even a small bias from the small node to change its state. We would also like to ensure that the large node does not bias the smaller one with very large weight, in order for the smaller to retain its value.
This problem arises in various parts of the PLS proof. For example, we would like the outputs of a circuit to be fed back to the inputs of the other one. The outputs have very small weight compared to the inputs, since the weights drop exponentially in the Circuit Computing gadget. We would like the inputs of Circuit 2 to change according to the outputs of circuit 1 and not the other way around. Another example involves the Equality Gadget, which influences the Control of the Circuit Computing gadget. The nodes of the Gadget have weights of the order of 2 10N , while the control nodes of the Circuit Computing gadget are of the order of 2 100N . We would like the output of the gadget to bias the Control nodes, while also remaining independent from them.
Let's get back to the original problem. A naive solution would be to connect node A directly with node B. However, this would result in node B biasing node A due to the larger weight it possesses. For example, if we connected Control1 with the control variables of Circuit 2, then they would always bias Control1 with a very large weight, rendering the entire Equality gadget useless. We would like to ensure that node A biases B with a relatively small weight, while also experiencing a small bias from it.
The solution we propose is a Leveraging gadget that is connected between nodes A and B. It's construction will depend on the weights A and B, as well as the bias that we would like B to experience from A. Before describing the construction, we discuss it's functionality on a high level.
As shown in Figure 7 , we place the gadget between the nodes A and B. We use two parameters x, in the construction. We first want to ensure that node A experiences a small bias from the gadget. This is why we put nodes L 1,1 , L 1,2 at the start with weight B/2 x+1 + , which puts a relatively small bias. We want these nodes to be dominated by A. This is why nodes L 1,3 , L 1,4 have combined weight less than A. However, these nodes cannot directly influence B, since it's weight dominates the weights of L 1,1 , L 1.2 . For this reason, we repeat this construction x + 1 times, until nodes L x,1 , L x,2 , whose combined weight is slightly larger than B. This means that nodes L x, 3 , L x,4 are not dominated by B and can therefore be connected directly with it. The details of the proof are given below. Proof. We first consider the nodes L 1,1 , L 1,2 . They both experience bias w A towards the opposite value of A, which is greater than the remaining weight of their neighbors 2 * w A − 2 * , and hence they are both dominated to take the opposite value of A. Similarly, the nodes L 1,3 , L 1,4 are now biased to take the opposite values of L 2,1 , L 2,2 with bias at least w B /2 x + 2 * , which is greater than the remaining neighbors of w B /2 x + . Hence, both L 1,3 , L 1,4 have the same value as A in any equilibrium. In a similar way, we can prove that, in any equilibrium L i,3 = L i,4 = A, and therefore B experiences bias w A /2 x + 2 * towards the opposite value of A, while A experiences bias at most w B /2 x − 2 * from this gadget.
Note that the above lemma works for any value of . This means that we can make the bias that B experiences arbitrarily close to w B /2 x . For all cases where such a Leverage gadget is used, it is implied that = 2 −1000N which is smaller than all other weights in the construction. Hence, we only explicitly specify the x parameter and, for simplicity, such a Leverage gadget is denoted as below schematically. 
B.2 Circuit Computing Gadget
Each of the two computing circuits is meant to both calculate the value of the underlying CircuitFlip instance, as well as the best neighboring solution. For technical reasons one of the two circuits will need to output the complement of the value instead of the value itself, so that comparison can be achieved later with a single node.
In this section we present the gadgets that implement the above circuits in a LocalNodeMax-Cut instance. The construction below is similar to the constructions of Schäffer and Yannakakis used to prove LocalMaxCut PLS-complete ( [18] ). Since NOR is functionally complete we can implement any circuit with a combination of NOR gates. In particular, each NOR gate is composed of the gadgets below. Each such gadget is parameterized by a variable n, and a NOR gadget with parameter n is denoted NOR(n). Since we wish for earlier gates to dominate later gates we order the gates in reverse topological order, so as to never have a higher numbered gate depend on a lower numbered gate. The ith gate in this ordering corresponds to a gadget N OR(2 N +i ). Note that the first gates of the circuit have high indices, while the final gates have the least indices.
We take care to number the gates so that the gates that each output the final bit of the value of the circuit are numbered with the n lowest indexes, i.e. the gate of the kth bit of the value corresponds to a gate N OR(2 N +k ). This is necessary so that their output nodes can be used for comparing the binary values of the outputs.
The input nodes of these gadgets are either an input node to the whole circuit or they are the output node of another NOR gate, in which case they have the weight prescribed by the previous NOR gate. The input nodes of the entire circuit (which are not the output nodes of any NOR gate) are given weight 2 5N . Moreover, we have y 1 i ,z 1 i nodes which are meant to bias the internal nodes of each gadget and determine its functionality. Specifically,
i are biased to have the same value as z 1 i . This is achieved by auxiliary nodes of weight 2 −200N , shown in Figure 10 . We also have auxiliary nodes ρ of weight 2 −500N that bias the output node g i to the correct NOR output value. Note that these nodes have the lowest weight in the entire construction. These control nodes, y 1 , z 1 , y 2 , z 2 are meant to decide the functionality of the gadget. We say that the y, z nodes have their natural value when y = 1 and z = 0. We say they have their unnatural value when y = 0 or z = 0. In general, when these nodes all have their natural values the NOR gadget is calculating correctly and when they have their unnatural values the circuit's inputs are indifferent to the gadget. Unlike Schäffer and Yannakakis ( [18] ) we add two extra control variable nodes y 3 , z 3 to each such NOR gadget, both of weight n − 50. The reason is to ascertain that in case of incorrect calculation at least one y variable will have its unnatural value. Otherwise, it would be possible, for example, to have an incorrect calculation with only z 2 being in an unnatural state.
These NOR gadgets are not used in isolation, but instead compose a larger computing circuit. As Schäffer and Yannakakis do ( [18] ), we connect each of the control variables z i , y i of the above construction so as to propagate their natural or unnatural values depending on the situation. The connection of these gadgets is done according to the ordering we established earlier. Recall that the last m gates correspond to gadgets calculating the value bits, the n gates before them correspond to the output gates of the next neighbor, and the rest are internal gates of the circuit. Figure 12 : Connecting the control nodes of the NOR gadgets. Recall that M is the number of total gates in the circuit, n is the number of solution bits and m is the number of value bits. Note that the gates are ordered in reverse, i.e the first gates have highest index.
These gadgets' function is twofold. Firstly, they detect a potential error in a NOR calculation and propagate it to further gates, if the control variables have their unnatural values. Second,if the control variables have their unnatural values, they insulate the inputs so that they are indifferent to the gadget and can be changed by any external slight bias.
Furthermore, all the nodes of these gadgets are all multiplied by a 2 100N weight, except the nodes of the NOR gadget corresponding to the final bits of the value which are multiplied by 2 90N . This is so that a possible error in the calculation of the next best neighbor supersedes any possible result of the comparison. The auxiliary nodes introduced above, which are meant to induce small biases to internal nodes, are not multiplied by anything.
Lastly, for technical simplicity, we have a single node for each computing circuit meant to induce bias to all control variable nodes y, z at the same time. The topology of the connection is presented below.
Figure 13: We use a single node Control to bias all control nodes y, z. Note that this node is connected with the y, z nodes through leverage gadgets
We now prove the properties of these gadgets.
Lemma 9.
In an equilibrium, if z 1 i = 1 and y 1 i = 0, then I 1 (g i ), I 2 (g i ) are indifferent with respect to the gadget G i . Proof. Since z 1 i = 1 and y 1 i = 0, by the previous lemma, z 2 i = 1 and y 2 i = 0 Since y 1 i = 0, 
Then c 1 i experiences bias towards 0 from g i and z 2 i which together with the 2 −200N bias from y 1 i means that his dominant strategy is to take the value 0. Now b 1 i experiences bias from c 1 i = 0 towards 1 as well as bias 2 100N * 2 i + 10 towards 1. Along with the 2 −200N bias from z 1 i we have that b 1 i = 1 in any equilibrium. Similarly, b 2 i = 1 by symmetry. Hence, in this case as well a 1 i is 0 in any equilibrium. Similarly, we get that a 2 i = 0 in any equilibrium. Assume both d 1 i = d 2 i = 0 then, as above, we have that b 3 i = 1 and hence at least one of the d would gain the edge of weight 2 −200N by taking the value 1. Hence, at least one d is equal to 1 and b 3 i = 0 since it is indifferent with respect to g, c 3 i . Since v is now indifferent with respect to d 1 i = 0, d 2 i = 1 it takes its preferred value v = 0. Since b 3 i = v = 0 we have that both d 1 i , d 2 i must take their preferred values d 1 i = d 2 i = 1 in any equilibrium. In both cases both a 1 i = a 2 i = 0, d 1 i = d 2 i = 1 and hence I 1 (g i ), I 2 (g i ) are indifferent with respect to the gadget. Lemma 10. If gate G i is incorrect, then z 2 i = 1. If y 2 i = 0 then z 2 i = 1. If z 2 i = 1, then for all j < i z 1 j = z 2 j = z 3 j = 1 and y 1 j = y 2 j = y 3 j = 0.
Proof. There are two possibilities if G i is incorrect. Either one of the inputs I 1 (g i ), I 2 (g i ) is 1 and g i = 1 or both I 1 (g i ) = I 2 (g i ) = 0 and g i = 0. In the first case, without loss of generality we have that I 1 (g i ) = 1. This means that node a 1 i is biased towards value 0 with weight at least 2 * 2 i+1 * 2 100N by I 1 (g i ) and constant node 1. This bias is greater than the weight of all the other neighbors of a 1 i combined. Hence, in equilibrium, a 1 i = 0. Hence, node b 1 i is biased towards value 1 with weight at least 2 * |a 1 i |, which is greater than the total weight of all the other neighbors of b 1 i combined. Hence, b 1 i = 1. Similarly, we can argue that a 2 i = 0 and b 2 i = 1 if I 2 (g i ) = 1. Since b 1 i = 1 and g i = 1, node c i is biased towards 0 with weight at least 2 * 2 i * 2 100N , which is greater than the total weight of all the other neighbors of c 1 i combined. Hence, c 1 i = 0. We now focus on node z 2 i . Its neighbors are two nodes of weight 2 i * 2 100N with constant value 0, nodes c 1 i , c 2 i , y 3 i and a constant node 1 with weights 2 100N * (2 i − 50) and some auxiliary nodes of negligible weight. If c 1 i = 0, then z 2 i is biased towards 1 with weight at least 3 * 2 i * 2 100N , which is greater than the weight of the remaining neighbors combined. Hence, in equilibrium, z 2 i = 1. Hence, the claim has been proved in this case. If I 2 (g i ) = 1, the proof is analogous. Now suppose I 1 (g i ) = I 2 (g i ) = 0 and g i = 0. Since I 1 (g i ) = 0, node d 1 i is biased towards 1 with weight at least 2 * 2 i+1 * 2 100N , which is greater that the weight of all its other neighbors combined. Hence, d 1 i = 1. Similarly, we can prove that d 2 i = 1. This means that node b 3 i is biased towards 0 with weight at least 2 * (2 i + 10) * 2 100N , which is greater than the weight of its other nodes combined. This implies that b 3 i = 0. By the same reasoning, v i = 0. Since b 3 i = g i = 0, node c 3 i is biased towards 1 with weight at least 2 * 2 i * 2 100N , which is greater than the weight of its other nodes combined. Hence, c 3 i = 1. Now we focus on node y 2 i . Its neighbors are a node of weight 2 i * 2 100N with constant value 1, node c 3 i with weight 2 i * 2 100N , z 1 i ,a constant node 1 both with weight 2 100N * (2 i 2 0) ,z 2 i and a constant 0 with weight 2 100N * 2 i − 10 and some auxiliary nodes of negligible weight. Hence, y 2 i is biased towards 0 with weight at least 2 * 2 i * 2 100N , which is greater than the weight of the remaining neighbors combined. Hence, y 2 i = 0. We are now going to prove that if y 2 i = 0, then z 2 i = 1, which concludes the proof for this case and is also the second claim of the lemma. We first notice that z 2 i is never biased towards 0 by the nodes of the NOR gadget. Hence, if the bias of the remaining nodes is towards 1, then z 2 i = 1 in equilibrium. We notice that nodes y 2 i and constant node 0 bias our node with weight 2 * (2 i − 10) * 2 100N , which is greater that any potential bias by nodes y 3 i and constant 1 in the chain of total weight 2 * 2 100N * (2 i − 50). Hence, z 2 i = 1. It remains to prove the last claim of the Lemma. It suffices to show that when a z i in the chain is 1, the next y i+1 will be 0 and the claim will follow inductively. By a similar argument to the one used for the second claim, node y i+1 is not biased towards 1 by any node in the NOR gadget. However, it experiences bias towards 0 from node z i and constant node 1, which is greater than any other potential bias from its other neighbors. Hence, y i+1 = 0 and the claim follows. Lemma 11. Suppose z 1 i = 0 and y 1 i = 1. If g i is correct then z 2 and y 2 are indifferent with respect to the other nodes of the gate G i . If g i is incorrect then g i is indifferent with respect to the other nodes of the gate G i , but gains the node ρ of weight 2 −500N .
Proof. Assume g i is corrrect.
Assume at least one of I 1 (g i ), I 2 (g i ) is equal to 1, say I 1 (g i ) = 1, hence at least one of d 1 i , d 2 i , assume d 1 i , is equal to 0. This is because otherwise it would experience bias from its neighbors I 1 (g i ),d 2 i towards 0 which, along with the bias from the auxiliary node between y 1 i and d 1 i , would dominate it towards 0. Therefore, b 3 i experiences bias towards 1 from both g i , which is correct, and d 1 i , which means, along with the bias from y 1 i , its equal to 1. Hence, c 3 i must be equal to 0, since it is dominated by the bias from b 3 i , the constant node of 1 and its auxiliary bias from z 1 i . Hence, c 3 i is 0 and y 2 i is indifferent. Assume I 1 (g i ) = 0, I 2 (g i ) = 0. Hence, d 1 i = 1, d 2 i = 1, which means that b 3 i = 0. Since g is correct, it must be g = 1, and therefore c 3 i = 0, since it can take its preferred value of 0, towards which it is biased by z 1 i . Therefore, y 2 i is indifferent to this gadget. Moreover, since g i = 0 it must be that c 1 i = c 2 i = 1 since they both have g i and a constant 0 node as their neighbors, which along with the bias from y i , dominates their bias. Since z 2 i neighbors with two 1 nodes and two 0 nodes it is indifferent with respect to this gadget.
In all cases, when g i is correct, y 2 i , z 2 i are indifferent. Assume g i is incorrect, Assume at least one of I 1 (g i ),I 2 (g i ) is equal to 1. Similarly to above, d 1 i = 0. Since, g i is incorrect c 3 i will be 0 due to the bias from g i , the constant node 1 and z 1 i . Hence, b 3 i = 1. The node g i is therefore indifferent with respect to this gadget.
Furthermore, since I 1 (g i ) = 1, a 1 i = 0 and b 1 i = 1. Since g i = 1 we have that c 3 i = 0. Also, since I 2 (g i ) = 0, a 2 i must take its preferred value of 1, and hence b 2 i takes its preferred value of 0. Similarly, c 2 i can also take its preferred value of 1. Overall, g i is connected to b 1 i = 1,c 1 i = 0,b 2 i = 0,c 2 i = 1 and hence is indifferent Assume both I 1 (g i ) = I 2 (g i ) = 0. Then d 1 i = d 2 i = 1, which means that b 3 i = 0, and since g i = 0, we have that c 3 i = 1. Hence, g i is indifferent with respect to this gadget. Because I 1 (g i ) = I 2 (g i ) = 0, we have that a 1 i = a 2 i = 1 since they can take their preferred values. Moreover, b 1 i = b 2 i = 0 since they are biased to 0 by z 2 i . Given that g i = 0 it must be that both c 1 i = c 2 i = 1. Therefore, g i indifferent in this case as well. Since in all cases that g i is incorrect, it is indifferent with respect to this gadget, it will adhere to the bias that the auxiliary gadget connecting a 1 i , a 2 i , g i gives to g i . If both I i is 1 then a 1 i = 0 and if I i = 0 then a 1 i = 1. In all cases, a i = ¬I i . Hence, the auxiliary gadget gives bias to g i towards 0, except when both I 1 (g i ) = I 2 (g i ) = 0 in which case it biases g i towards 1. This means that g i has a 2 −500N bias towards its NOR value. 2. Since Control = 0, by lemma 13 all y, z have their unnatural values. Since all NOR gadgets have unnatural control nodes we have that their inputs are indifferent with respect to the gadgets. Hence, the claim that they are unbiased follows.
3. The Control node is connected to a node N otControl , of weight W N otControl = 2 7N , as well as to several leverage gadgets, which contribute bias at most 2 100N −94N = 2 6N . Hence, the 2 7N bias dominates.
B.3 Equality Gadget
The Equality Gadgets are used to check whether the next best neighbor of a circuit has been successfully transferred to the input of the other circuit. The output of the Equality gadget is connected to the control variables of the circuit that should receive the new input. If the new input has not been transferred, the output of this gadget biases the Control node towards 0, which biases the internal control nodes towards unnatural values. This enables the inputs of the circuit to change successfully to the next solution. When the new solution is transferred, the output of the gadget changes, in order to bias the control nodes towards their natural values, so that the computation can take place.
Since we have two possible directions, both from Circuit A to Circuit B and vice versa we need two copies of the gadgets described in this section.
We will now describe the function of the Equality Gadget when Circuit A gives feedback to Circuit B. The Equality Gadget takes as inputs the T A nodes from the CopyA Gadgets and I B and simply checks whether they are equal. Due to Lemma 2, in equilibrium the T A nodes have the same value as NextA which we want to transfer. One might try to connect NextA as input to the Equality gadget. The reason we avoid this construction is that we do not want the output nodes of the Circuit Computing gadget C A to experience any bias from this gadget, because the computation changes their value with very small bias. For this reason, we connect T A nodes to the input that are dominated by η A nodes. The input nodes I B are dominated by either the nodes in the NOR gadgets or η A , hence we can connect them directly as inputs to the gadget.
For each bit of the next best neighbor, we construct a gadget as in Figure 14 , which performs the equality check for the i − th bit of the next best neighbor. The idea for this construction is very simple: the weights decrease as we come closer to the output, so that the input values dominate the final result. If the inputs are equal, the final value will be 0. Notice that we have put and intermediate node between I B and the gadget to ensure that the two input nodes will have equal weight. A detailed analysis is provided in the proof of Lemma 1. Now that we have gadgets to perform bit wise equality checks, we need to connect them all to produce the output of the Equality gadget. This is done by the construction of Figure 14 Essentially, the idea is that if all the bits are equal, all the comparison results will be 0 and will dominate the ControlB to take 1. If at least one result is 1, then together with the constant node 1 will bias ControlB to take value 0.
We now prove the main lemma concerning the Equality Gadget, which states that in equilibrium, the output of the Equality will be 1 if and only if the two inputs to the gadget are equal.
Lemma 1.
Proof. For simplicity we only prove the second claim, since the first follows by similar arguments. We first focus on on the behavior of a single Equality gadget. We would like to prove that R i,A = 0 if and only if I i,B = T i,A .
We first observe that node e 1 i,A is biased with weight 2 105N by I i,B , which is greater that the bias from its other neighbor e 2 i,A . Hence, in equilibrium it is always the case that e 1 i,A = ¬I i,B . Moreover, nodes e 2 i,A and e 3 i,A essentially function as the complements of e 1 i,A and T i,A . This is because they are biased with weight 2 30N by them, which is greater than the bias by node e 5 i,A . Hence, e 2 i,A = ¬e 1 i,A and e 3 i,A = ¬T i,A . We first examine the case where I B = T A . Then e 1 i,A = ¬T i,A . Since these nodes have equal weights, node e 4 i,A experiences 0 total bias from them and is biased by constant node 0 with weight 2 20N and by R 2 with weight 2 9N . Therefore, e 4 i,A = 1. By the previous observations we have that e 2 i,A and e 3 i,A have opposite values, which means that e 5 i,A has bias 0 from these two nodes. Is also has bias 2 20N by constant 0 and 2 9N from R i,A . Hence, e 5 i,A = 1. Nodes e 4 i,A and e 5.i bias node R i,A towards 0 with weight 2 * 2 20N , which is greater than the bias from constant 0 and ControlB. As a result, we have that R i,A = 0 and the argument is complete in this case.
Now we examine the case where I i,B = T i,A . Assume that I i,B = 1, the other case follows similarly. Then, e 1 i,A = 0, T i,A = 0, e 2 i,A = 1, e 3 i,A = 1. This means that e 5 i,A is biased with weight at least 2 * 2 30N towards 1, which is greater than the combined weight of R i,A and constant 0. Therefore, e 5 i,A = 0. Now we observe that R i,A is biased with weight at least 2 * 2 20N towards 1 by nodes e 5 i,A and constant 0, which is greater that the combined weight of e 4 i,A and ControlB. Hence, R i,A = 1 in this case. If I i,B = 0, then we could prove similarly that e 4 i,A = 0, which implies that R i,A = 1 by the same argument.
We will now prove that ControlB takes the appropriate value. First of all, we observe that ControlB is connected with NotControlB, (part of the Circuit Computing gadget) which has weight 2 7N and with R i,A nodes which have weight 2 9N . It is also biased with weight slightly more than 2 6N by each of the control variables y i due to the leverage gadget. This means that for N large enough ControlB is dominated by the behavior of the R i,A nodes. Suppose that I i,B = T i,A for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By the preceding calculations, we have that R i,A = 0 for all i. Hence, ControlB experiences total bias n * 2 9N towards 1, which is greater than the weight of constant node 1. Thus, ControlB = 1 in this case. Now suppose that there exists a j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, such that I 2,j = ¬T j,A . By the preceding calculations, R j,A = 1. Hence, node ControlB is biased by nodes R j,A and constant 1 towards 0 with weight at least (n − 1) * 2 9N + 2 9N = n * 2 9N , which is greater than the combined weight of all the other R i,A 's. Therefore, ControlB = 0 in this case and the proof is complete.
B.4 Copy Gadget
The Copy Gadgets transfer the values of the next best Neighbor of a circuit to the input of the other circuit. This is fundamental for the correct computation of the local optimum. There are some technical conditions that these gadgets should satisfy, which we discuss in the following.
The purpose of the Copy Gadgets is twofold. Firstly, when the Flag node has value 1, they are meant to give the inputs of Circuit B a slight bias to take the values of the best flip neighbor that Circuit A offers, that is NextA. Secondly, in this case they are meant to give zero bias to the output nodes of Circuit A that calculate the best flip neighbors. This is because when node Flag is 1, the input of circuit A is going to change, which means that the NOR gates of this circuit will compute the new values. A consequence of the functionality of the NOR gadgets is that the outputs of a gadget are only biased towards the correct value with a very small weight. This is because the gadget is constructed in a way that allows these nodes to be indifferent to all of their neighbors when the time comes to change their value. As a result, if we connect the output nodes with other gadgets, we have to ensure that they will experience zero bias from them in order for the computation to take place properly. Since the outputs of Circuit A that produce the next best neighbor are connected to the Copy Gadgets, we should ensure that they will experience zero bias when node Flag is 1, so that they can change properly. A similar functionality should be implemented when node Flag is 0.
In this Section we present the gadgets that implement the above functionality. There are two Copy gadgets with similar topology, CopyA and CopyB. For simplicity, we only describe the details of CopyA. The gadget takes as input the value of node Flag, which determines whether a value should be copied or whether the outputs of Circuit A should experience zero bias. It also takes as input NextA, which is the next best neighbor calculated by Circuit A. The output of the gadget is a bias to nodes I B and T A towards adopting the value of NextA.
At this point, one might wonder why we didn't just connect the output of the CopyA gadget to the input I B . This is because the value of I B also depends on the control variables. If the control variables of the input gates have natural values, then the inputs experience great bias from the gate, making it impossible for their values to change by the Copy Gadget. Hence, the Copy Gadget gives a slight bias to node T A , which is an input to an auxiliary circuit that compares it with I B (i.e the Equality gadget) . If they are not equal, this means that the output has not been transferred yet. In this case, the output of the gadget is given a suitable value to bias the control nodes towards unnatural values. When this happens, the inputs I B can change to the appropriate values. Figure 15 : The gadgets that copy the values from one circuit to the other Note that we have one of the above gadgets for each of the bits of the next best neighbor solution that the Circuit Computing gadgets output.
We have a gadget of Figure 15 for each of the m bits of the next best neighbor. Nodes F i,A has a very large weight in order to dominate the behavior of η i,A . However, we do not want this node to influence the behavior of Flag. For this reason, we connect Flag with F i,A using a Leveraging gadget. Notice that the behavior of F i,A is dominated by Flag by weight at least 2 50N . Another important point is that we connect the output of the CopyA gadget with the input of Circuit B using another Leveraging gadget. This is due to the fact that the weight of the input nodes is of the order of 2 105N , which is far more than the weight of η i,A . Hence, we do not want the input nodes to influence the value of η i,A , while also ensuring that the Copy gadget gives a slight bias to the inputs I B towards the value of NextA.
We now prove Lemma 2, which makes precise the already stated claims about the function of the Copy Gadgets. Proof. We prove the claim for Flag = 1. The case Flag = 0 is identical.
We begin with the first claim. Due to the leveraging gadget, node F i,B experiences bias from Flag which is slightly less than 2 50N . Hence, it is biased towards 0 with weight at least 2 49N . This is greater than the weight of η i,B , which is the other neighbor of F i,B . Hence, F i,B = 0 at equilibrium. Now node η i,B experiences zero total bias from nodes F i,B and constant 1 and biases 2 100N by NextB i , 2 30N by T i,B and slightly more that 2 75N by the input I i,A due to leveraging, which means that its value at equilibrium will be determined by NextB i . Specifically, η i,B = ¬NextB i at equilibrium. Now, node T i,B experiences bias 2 40N from η i,B and biases of the order of 2 7N from the gates of the controller gadget. Hence, T i,B has bias towards NextB i equal to w η i,B and will take this value at equilibrium.
To prove the second claim, we use the already proven fact that η i,B = ¬NextB i when Flag = 1. Due to the Leverage gadget, node I i experiences bias slightly less than 2 10N from node η i,B . Since ControlA = 0, by Lemma 3, we have that I i,A is indifferent with respect to the gadget C A , and will therefore take the value of ¬η i,B = NextB i = T i,B Lemma 3. At any equilibrium point of the LocalNodeMaxCut instance of Figure 3 :
• If Flag = 1 then any node in NextA experience 0 bias with respect to the CopyX" gadget.
• If Flag = 0 then then any node in NextB experience 0 bias with respect to the CopyB gadget.
Proof. We notice that due to leveraging, node F i,A of gadget CopyA experiences bias slightly less than 2 50N from node Flag = 1. This dominates its behavior, since the other neighbor η i,A has weight that is orders of magnitude smaller. Hence, F i,A = 0. Now, node η i,X" experiences total bias 2 * 2 110N from nodes F i,A and constant 0, 2 100N from N extA i , 2 30N from T i,A and slightly more than 2 75N from I i,B due to the Leverage gadget used. This means that η i,A = 1. Now we are ready to prove our claim. Node NextA i is connected to nodes η i,A and constant 0 of gadget CopyA i . They have the same weight and opposite values at equilibrium. This means that NextA i has 0 bias with respect to CopyA i , i.e it is indifferent.
The case for Flag = 0 follows symmetrically.
B.5 Comparator gadget
The purpose of the Comparator gadget is to implement the binary comparison between the bits of the values of the two circuits. At the same time we need to ensure that the nodes of the losing circuit (i.e the circuit with the lower value) are indifferent with respect to the Comparator gadget, so that Lemma 3 can be applied.
In particular, the output nodes that correspond to the bits of the value, presented in section B.2, with weights 2 90N * 2 N +i are each connected as below.
Note that the output bits of the second circuit X" are the complement of their true values, in order to achieve comparison with a single bit. The weight of the Flag node is 2 80N Figure 16 : Nodes of the Comparator gadget. Note that Circuit X" is meant to output the complement of its true output.
To see why the value of node Flag implements binary comparison one needs to consider four cases: In the first two, where the ith bits are both equal, the total bias Flag experiences is zero, since it experiences bias towards a certain bit as well as the complement of said bit. In the other two, where one bit is 1 and the other is 0, the Flag node will experience 2 i bias towards either value, which will supersede all lower bits. However, the Comparator gadget is meant not only to implement comparison between values, but also to detect whether a circuit is computing wrongly and, hence, to fix it. To this end we connect the following control nodes to the node Flag: the control nodes y 3 m+1,A for circuit A and z 3 m+1,B for circuit B, where m + 1 is the last NOR gadget before the bits of the values (recall that we have m value bits and that w y 3 i,A = w z 3 i,B = 2 100N * (2 N +m+1 − 50)) (see Figure 12 ), as well as the control nodes y 3 i,A , z 3 i,B , ∀i ≤ m for each NOR gadget that corresponds to an output bit of the value (which have weight w y 3 i,A = w z 3 i,B = 2 90N * (2 N +i − 50)). The nodes y 3 m+1,A and z 3 m+1,B are used to check whether the next best neighbor has been correctly computed. If it isn't, these nodes dominate Flag, due to their large weight of 2 100N compared to the weight of the value bits, which is of the order of 2 90N . The control nodes of the output bits of the value are used in a more intricate way to ensure that even if one to the results is not correct, the output of the comparison is the desired one. Details are provided in Lemma 14. All these nodes are connected in such a way that a control node with unnatural value, biases Flag towards fixing that circuit. We prove the following properties: Proof. Suppose Flag = 1. Then the only nodes of C A connected to the Comparator gadget are the value output bits and certain control nodes, in such a way that they are connected to either Flag or a constant node 0 of weight equal to Flag. In all cases, both biases cancel each other out and the nodes of Circuit A are indifferent. Suppose Flag = 0. Then the only nodes of C B connected to Flag are also connected with a constant 1 node. Similarly to the first case, all nodes of circuit B are indifferent with respect to the Comparator gadget when Flag = 0.
We now prove the most important lemma of the Comparator gadget. Our goal is to compare the output values of the two circuits, so that we change the input of the circuit with the smaller real value. The main difficulty lies in that one or both of the circuits might produce incorrect bits in their output. A simple idea would be to try to detect any incorrect output bits and influence Flag accordingly, as we do with control variables y 3 m+1,A and z 3 m+1,B . However, if the least significant bit of a circuit is incorrect, the weight of the corresponding control node is exponentially smaller that the rest of the bits. Hence, it cannot dominate the outcome of the comparison. This means that sometimes we might be in equilibrium where some output nodes are incorrect. To alleviate this problem we propose this construction.
The idea behind this lemma is very simple: if it is guaranteed that the output of one of the circuits is correct and we know which bits of the other circuit might be wrong, we can still compare their true values. This is accomplished by an extension of the traditional comparison method, by also taking into account the control variables of the output bits and examining all the possible cases. This lemma is very useful in our proof, since by Lemma 5 we know that at least one of the circuits computes correctly in equilibrium. Since for all gates that do not correspond to value bits (see Figure 12 ), we have that they possess natural values, and hence Flag is indifferent with respect to them, we only need to examine the final m gates that correspond to the value bits.
We denote the kth bit of Val A , Val B as A k , B k . B k corresponds to the actual value of the kth bit of the circuit B instead of its complement for simplicity. The actual value of the node corresponding to B k is the opposite. We also denote z 2 k,B the control node corresponding to the bit B k . We make the distinction between A k , B k and Real(A k ), Real(B k ). These may be equal or different depending on whether the circuit calculated the kth bit correctly. By the assumption we know that A k = Real(A k ) since A calculates correctly. We do not know whether B k = Real(B k ), but we do know that B k = Real(B k ) =⇒ z 2 k,B = 1. We consider three cases. In the case that (A k , B k , z 2 k,B ) ∈ (0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1), Flag experiences bias at most 2 * 2 90N * (50) from this bit towards Flag = 1 in any of these cases. In this case, we have that either Real(A k ) = Real(B k ) or Real(A k ) < Real(B k ), depending on whether B k calculated correctly. Either way, Real(A k ) ≤ Real(B k ).
In the case that (A k , B k , z 2 k,B ) ∈ (0, 1, 0), Flag experiences bias 2 * 2 90N * (2 N +k ) from this bit towards Flag = 1. In this case, we have that Real(A k ) < Real(B k ), since both calculate correctly.
In the case that (A k , B k , z 2 k,B ) ∈ (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1) then Flag experiences bias at least 2 * 2 90N * (2 N +k − 50) towards Flag = 0 from this bit in any of these cases. In these cases, Real(A k ) might be higher, but we will show that these cases can never matter.
Since Flag = 1 and we have that ControlA = 1, by Lemma 13 all control nodes of C A have their natural values. Furthermore, since by the proof of Lemma 6 we know that all control nodes of weight 2 1 00N have their natural values, we can apply Lemma 14. Therefore, Real − V al(
The proof for Flag = 0 is identical.
